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THE GALLOWS TO THE GURNEY: ANALYZING THE
(UN)CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE METHODS OF
EXECUTION
ROBERTA M. HARDING-
I. INTRODUCTION
The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibits the
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment,' and the Supreme Court of the
United States has firmly established that death as a penalty for the commission
of certain homicides does not violate this proscription.2 Currently the states em-
ploy a variety of methods to extinguish a condemned individual's life. Lethal in-
jection, lethal gas, electrocution, hanging, and a firing squad are the methods
presently being used to effectuate a state mandated penalty of death.
3
Condemned inmates, however, are increasingly challenging the constitutional-
ity of these methods of execution.4 Despite the multitude of cases on this issue,
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.S., University
of San Francisco, 1981; J.D., Harvard University, 1986. I am grateful to Susan Maines,
my Research Assistant, and Sandy Emerson and Teena Archer, my Staff Assistants, for
their assistance with this project.
The Amendment states, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII (emphasis
added). In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Supreme Court applied the
Eighth Amendment to the states.
2 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (joint opinion). Presently 38 states, the
federal government, and the military use death as a method of punishment. See Appendi-
ces A and B, infra. Since the Supreme Court's 1976 ruling in Gregg, approximately 302
individuals have been executed. See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FuND, DEATH Row, U.S.A.
3 (Fall 1995). Texas, Florida, Virginia, and Louisiana are the states that lead the nation in
the number of individuals executed since the death penalty's reaffirmation. See id. at 10.
Although the United States is not the only country in the global community with the
death penalty, it is the only one of its Western partners that permits capital punishment.
See ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLD.-WIDE PERSPECTIVE (1989).
3 See Appendix A, infra.
" Not long after the Supreme Court's decision in Gregg, one commentator predicted
that "a wave of cases examining the legality of the traditional modes of execution cannot
be far away." Martin R. Gardner, Execution and Indignities - An Eighth Amendment As-
sessment of Methods of Inflicting Capital Punishment, 39 OHIO ST. L. J. 96, 97 (1978)
(footnote omitted). See Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 687 (9th Cir.) (death by hanging
is not cruel and unusual punishment), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994); Woolls v. Me-
Cotter, 798 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1986) (use of sodium thiopental for lethal injection is not
cruel and unusual punishment); Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 1061 (5th Cir.) (lethal gas
as a method of execution is not cruel and unusual punishment), cert. denied, 463 U.S.
1237 (1983); Sullivan v. Dugger, 721 F.2d 719 (11th Cir. 1983) (death by electrocution is
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there are no coherent and uniform tenets regarding how to analyze a charge that
a particular method of execution violates the Eighth Amendment. This reality re-
flects the Supreme Court's recognition in 1878 that "[d]ifficulty would attend
the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision
which provides that cruel and unusual punishment shall not be inflicted." 5
Unfortunately, the jurisprudence in this particular area of the law has not sig-
nificantly improved. This is primarily because the Court has avoided cases
which would have provided an opportunity to clarify the complex and controver-
sial issue of how the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause should be inter-
preted in the context of determining whether the aforementioned modes of exe-
cution comply with the prohibition embodied in the Eighth Amendment. This
"tactic" led one jurist to observe that the Supreme Court "has rarely . . . ad-
dressed whether particular methods of execution employed in this country are
unconstitutionally cruel."6 As a result, a significant amount of dissension exists
not unconstitutional); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978) (death by
electrocution is not cruel and unusual punishment); Gerlaugh v. Lewis, 898 F. Supp.
1388, 1413 & n.19 (D. Ariz. 1995) (death by lethal gas is not unconstitutional); Booker
v. Murphey, 3:95CV49 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (challenge to execution by lethal gas); Hunt v.
Smith, 856 F. Supp. 251 (D. Md. 1994) (execution by lethal gas is not cruel and unusual
punishment), aff'd sub. nom. Hunt v. Nuth, 57 F.3d 1327 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 724 (1996); Harris by and through Ramseyer v. Blodgett, 853 F. Supp. 1239
(W.D. Wash. 1994) (death by hanging is not cruel and unusual punishment); Hill v. Lock-
hart, 791 F. Supp. 1388, 1394 (E.D. Ark. 1992) (death by lethal injection does not offend
the Eighth Amendment); Dix v. Newsome, 584 F. Supp. 1052 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (death by
electrocution is not cruel and unusual); Mitchell v. Hopper, 538 F. Supp. 77 (S.D. Ga.
1982) (electrocution is not unnecessarily cruel and tortious); McCorquodale v. Balkcom,
525 F.Supp. 408 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (death by electrocution is not cruel and unusual punish-
ment); Ruiz v. Arkansas, 582 S.W.2d 915 (Ark. 1979) (same); Booker v. Florida, 397
So.2d 910 (Fla. 1981) (same); Godfrey v. Francis, 308 S.E.2d 806 (Ga. 1983) (same);
Glass v. Louisiana, 455 So.2d 659 (La. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1080 (1985); Martin
v. Commonwealth, 271 S.E.2d 123 (Va. 1980) (death by electrocution is not constitution-
ally impermissible). But see Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1994),
aff'd, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996) (lethal gas as a method of execution violates the
Eighth Amendment's proscription against the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishments).
I Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878). Legal commentators and jurists con-
sistently have acknowledged that the clause's ambiguity is one of its most pronounced
and problematic characteristics. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958) (plurality
opinion) (exact scope of constitutional phrase "cruel and unusual" has not been detailed
by this Court) (footnote omitted); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368-69 (1910)
(clause's contours have not been "exactly decided" and an "exhaustive definition" has
not yet been developed); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 264 (1972) (per
curiam) (Brennan, J., concurring (citing Weems, 217 U.S. at 369)); Jackson v. Bishop, 404
F.2d 571, 577-79 (8th Cir. 1968) (citing Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135-36).
6 Campbell, 18 F.3d at 681 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994); see also
Gray v. Lucas 710 F.2d 1048, 1049 (5th Cir.) (noting that the Supreme Court has not ad-
dressed the constitutionality of the gas chamber), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983);
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among the lower courts regarding the appropriate analytical standard to use
when assessing whether a specific method of execution constitutes cruel and un-
usual punishment.7 Only recently has a Court of Appeals developed a standard
to address the issue. In its February 21, 1996 opinion affirming a district court
judge's decision that execution by lethal gas violates the Eighth Amendment,8
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit devised a standard for
evaluating the constitutionality of methods of execution.9
The objective of this article is to examine this issue by formulating an analyti-
cal framework for determining when methods of execution constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. 0 This task is accomplished Part II by briefly tracing the
historical evolution of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause. Part HI examines the prohibition's core components. Part IV reviews the
traditional and modem interpretations of cruel and unusual punishment as ap-
plied to the methods of capital punishment, and assesses the standard with which
to determine whether a specific method of execution comports with the present
interpretation of cruel and unusual punishment as it is used in the context of
capital punishment. The crux of this article explores and develops the qualita-
tive, or subjective, facet of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, conclud-
ing that such a standard offers the best test for determining whether a method of
execution is constitutional.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT'S CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENTS CLAUSE
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punish-
ment." This proscription originated in the English Bill of Rights of 1689.12 The
Gardner, supra note 4, at 97, 103. Gardner's article presents another analytical framework
for evaluating the constitutionality of the modes of execution.
7 An excellent example of this contentious and occasionally acrimonious disagreement
is presented in the majority and dissenting opinions in the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994). Another
example may be found in Judge Patel's opinion in Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387
(N.D. Cal. 1994), affd, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996). Judge Patel commented on how the
lack of uniformity and guidance made it "difficult at times to decipher the Campbell
opinion," id. at 1409, which she referred to in rendering her opinion in Fierro. See also
supra note 4.
" See Fierro, 865 F. Supp. 1387.
9 See Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996).
10 Judge Reinhardt aptly observed that "[tihe issue of what methods of punishment are
unconstitutional is one that lies at the heart of the Eighth Amendment." Campbell, 18
F.3d at 695 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
" See supra note I.
12 For a detailed discussion of the origins and history of the Eighth Amendment, see
Anthony F. Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original Mean-
ing, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839 (1969); see also Note, What Is Cruel and Unusual Punishment,
24 HARv. L. REv. 54 (1910) [hereinafter What Is Cruel and Unusual Punishment].
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English adopted this prohibition in response to the Stuart regime's frequent use
of torture and other barbaric measures against English subjects.13 These concerns
followed the colonists across the Atlantic to the New World. In 1791 Congress
addressed the populace's trepidation by adopting for ratification the Eighth
Amendment to the Constitution. 14 Although this prohibition was a part of the
Bill of Rights, nearly eighty years passed before the Supreme Court began to
shape the clause's contours. 5 It was not until 1962 that the Court expressly an-
nounced that the Eighth Amendment's bar against the infliction of cruel and un-
usual punishments applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
16
III. THE CLAUSE'S CORE COMPONENTS
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause has two primary dimensions:
methods of punishment and proportionality. The methods of punishment compo-
nent ensures that a specific mode of punishment is not cruel and unusual. For
example, since the Eighth Amendment was adopted it has been assumed that
previous traditional forms of punishment-such as burning alive on the stake,
crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling while alive, drawing and
quartering, and public dissection-were manifestly cruel and unusual methods of
punishment for an offense.
17
13 See What Is Cruel and Unusual Punishment, supra note 12, at 55; see generally
Granucci, supra note 12.
14 See U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII (1791).
15 See Purveyor v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475, 479-80 (1867).
16 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). However, the posture of the
Court's discussion in an earlier case suggests that the Court either wanted to subject the
states to the Eighth Amendment's limitations or implicitly applied the ban to the states.
See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 443-47 (1890) (per curiam). Nonetheless, the Court ul-
timately determined that death by electrocution did not violate Mr. Kemmler's due pro-
cess rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. Despite this holding, the substance
of the opinion was dependent upon the Court's consideration of whether death by electro-
cution constituted cruel and unusual punishment. For example, the Court relied upon the
assurances made to it by New York's courts that the electric chair would result in a pain-
less and instantaneous death. See id. at 442-44; see also Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp.
1387, 1409 n.24 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (Judge Patel reached a similar conclusion regarding the
substance of the Kemmler Court's analysis), affd, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996); see Gard-
ner, supra note 4, at 100-02.
17 See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878); see also Glass v. Louisiana, 471
U.S. 1079, 1084 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting to denial of certiorari); Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U.S. 238, 264-65 (1972) (per curiam) (Brennan, J., concurring); Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 & n.4 (1947); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,
446-47 (1889); Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 681 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2124 (1994); Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 1058 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 1237
(1983); Fierro, 865 F. Supp. at 1409; Gardner, supra note 4, at 100-01; Granucci, supra
note 12, at 863-65.
Other former barbaric methods of punishment include the following: "a chamber of
metal spikes or [the Sicilian] body cage where the only way to come out is as a skele-
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Proportionality is concerned with guaranteeing the absence of a drastic disparity
between the severity of the offense and the punishment imposed. 18 Weems v.
United States19 provides the classic illustration of this fundamental principle. In
Weems the petitioner had been convicted for falsifying a cash book, an official
public document,20 and was sentenced to cadena temporal.21 The Court, finding
the disparity between the crime and the punishment "repugnant to the bill of
rights," reversed the judgment and dismissed the proceedings against Weems.
22
Although the rights protected by the Eighth Amendment are comprised of
these two distinct components, the "cruel and unusual punishments" analysis
should not cease at this juncture. Instead, the analysis must advance to explore
the issue of how the phrase "cruel and unusual punishments" is applied to a
specific method of execution. This first consideration requires an examination of
how the clause has been interpreted in this context.
IV. INTERPRETING "CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT" IN THE CONTEXT OF
METHODS OF EXECUTION
The long-acknowledged ambiguity of the clause's language makes interpreting
the cruel and unusual clause in this context a difficult task.23 In fact, "the ab-
sence of an exact or exhaustive definition of the [Eighth] Amendment's ban has
been repeatedly noted." '2 4 For example, in Trop v. Dulles 2 the Supreme Court
acknowledged that "[tlhe exact scope of the constitutional phrase 'cruel and un-
usual punishment' has not been detailed."2 Nonetheless, the decisions interpret-
ing the clause reveal its initial interpretation in this context and provide the
ton;" the "bronze bull" into which the offender was placed inside and cooked alive over
an open fire; and being "impaled inside the 'Virgin of Nuremberg,' a spike-filled metal
chamber." These tools of punishment can be viewed at the Criminology and Torture Mu-
seum in Rome, Italy. Brian Murphy, Where The Words 'Cruel And Unusual Punishment"
Don't Do Justice, AP, Mar. 5, 1994, available in WESTLAW, Associated Press file.
IS See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (the punishment of death is dis-
proportionate when the defendant did not commit the murder); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("[A] sentence of death is grossly disproportion-
ate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape and therefore is forbidden by the
Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment.") (footnote omitted).
19 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
20 See id. at 357.
21 See id. at 356. Cadena temporal is an extremely harsh punishment, requiring the
convicted individual to "labor for the benefit of the state[,] . .. always carry a chain at
the ankle . .. [and] be employed at hard and painful labor" for twelve to twenty years.
The convict is also placed under surveillance for life. See id. at 364-66.
22 Id. at 382.
23 See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878); see supra note 5.
24 Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 577 (8th Cir. 1968) (citations omitted); see also
Weems, 217 U.S. at 368-69.
2 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
26 Id. at 99.
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foundation for an analytical scheme for investigating the constitutionality of a
method of execution.
A. The Historical Interpretation Test
The traditional analytical model is rooted in history, thus the nomenclature
"the historical interpretation test." This test requires a historically oriented eval-
uation of the method of punishment under consideration. Consequently, if the
proposed mode of execution was banned in 1791 when the Eighth Amendment
was adopted, then that method of punishment is virtually a per se violation of
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.27 Conversely, if the method of exe-
cution was legal in 1791, such as hanging or use of a firing squad, it would not
violate the clause's ban.
28
Applying this traditional method of analysis became problematic when techno-
logical advances brought about new methods of execution that were nonexistent
when the Eighth Amendment was adopted, such as electrocution and lethal gas.
A prime example of this quagmire appears in In re Kemmler,29 which was the
first case tacitly to find that a method of execution - electrocution - was not
cruel and unusual punishment. Kemmler had the misfortune of being the first in-
dividual selected for this form of execution.30 In objecting to this method of exe-
cution, Kemmler charged that it violated state and federal constitutional prohibi-
tions against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments and deprived him
of due process under the federal Constitution.31 The Court of Appeals of New
York rejected Kemmler's position, and adopted the lower court's holding that
death by electrocution was not cruel and unusual punishment. 32 On review, the
Supreme Court facially rejected Kemmler's proposition that the Court use the
27 The Weems Court observed that the historical test is basically a "backwards look-
ing" test. Weems, 217 U.S. at 377. See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 262
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Weems for this description of the historical inter-
pretative test); see supra text accompanying note 17 (describing punishments banned at
the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted).
See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878) (firing squad). Even modern courts have
resorted to this interpretation. For example, in Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994), the Ninth Circuit used the historical interpretation
test to evaluate a challenge to the constitutionality of execution by hanging. To support
its conclusion that death by hanging did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the
court stated that "[there is no dispute that execution by hanging was acceptable when
the Bill of Rights was adopted." Campbell, 18 F.3d at 682.
29 136 U.S. 436 (1889).
30 See id. New York had just passed legislation instituting death by this new method.
The statute mandated that "[tlhe punishment of death must, in every case, be inflicted by
causing to pass through the body of the convict a current of electricity of sufficient inten-
sity to cause death, and the application of such current must be continued until such con-
vict is dead. See id. at 444-45.
31 See id. at 440-42.
32 See id. at 443-44.
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Eighth Amendment as a vehicle to decide the constitutionality of electrocu-
tion.33Despite its "formal" repudiation, it can be argued that the Court implicitly
decided that one reason New York could effectuate death by electrocution was
because this method did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Support-
ing this proposition is the Court's statement that "[plunishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not
cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies
there is something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extin-
guishment of life." ' 34 Thus, the Court might have implicitly used an Eighth
Amendment analysis to determine the constitutionality of the proposed method
of execution. 5 The statement also reflects the Court's effort to define the phrase
"cruel and unusual punishments."
Although In re Kemmler has varying interpretations, the case still marks a
turning point in the continued viability of the historical interpretation test. The
Court realized that applying the historical interpretative test to determine the
constitutionality of methods of punishment was becoming increasingly difficult
as technological advances in the area of life extinguishment continued to be
made. 36 Consequently, the simplistic and unsophisticated historical interpretation
33 See id. at 446. There is some debate as to whether the Supreme Court implicitly
made the Eighth Amendment's prohibition applicable to the states in In re Kemmler. Jus-
tice Burton, while noting that the In re Kemmler case was decided on due process
grounds, see Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 472 (1947), also noted
that the In re Kemmler Court refers to the "cruel and unusual punishments" language in
the Constitution when deciding that death by electrocution is constitutional. Id. at 476;
see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 323 (Marshall, J. concurring); Fierro v.
Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1409 n.24 (N.D. Cal. 1995), aft'd, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir.
1996).
34 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447 (emphasis added).
35 If the Court did implicitly apply the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishments in New York to In re Kemmler, it later repudiated that implied
application of the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment ban. Three years
later in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892), the Court reconsidered the issue of the
applicability of the Eighth Amendment to the states. In O'Neil a large fine was imposed
against a defendant convicted of bootlegging. See id. at 330. Nonpayment of the fine
would result in incarceration with hard labor. See id. at 331. Mr. O'Neil objected to the
imposition of this sentence on the grounds that it violated the Eighth Amendment. The
Court rejected his argument and held that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to the
states. See id. at 332. Given the posture of the case, however, the Court's decision might
not have detracted from the concerns regarding the cruelty of methods of execution previ-
ously announced in In re Kemmler. For example, in O'Neil the defendant was convicted
of 307 individual offenses which he claimed were excessive. See id. at 331. The Court's
disagreement with this proposition suggests that the Court's pronouncement addressed the
proportionality dimension of the Eighth Amendment and not the method of punishment
dimension. See supra Part II1 for a discussion of the proportionality facet. See Gardner,
supra note 4, at 101 (at the minimum the Court used In re Kemmler "to discuss the cruel
and unusual punishment clause").
36 As previously noted this was an integral part of the Kemmler case where the Court
19961
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method of analysis became insufficient in determining whether the implementa-
tion of a particular method of execution violated the cruel and unusual punish-
ments prohibition.
The historical test's inadequacy in the modem world provided an impetus for
the creation and adoption of a new guiding principle. The Supreme Court noted
the propriety of adopting a new approach when it stated that
[1legislation . . . is enacted, it is true, from an experience of evils, but its
general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form
that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence
new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be ca-
pable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is
particularly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments, de-
signed to meet passing occasions.
3 7
Eventually the cruel and unusual punishment jurisprudence definitively evolved
to include a dynamic stance.3 8 The Court's opinion in Trop v. Dulles"9 latched
onto this principle, noting that the "scope [of the Eighth Amendment] is not
static." 40 This statement sowed the seeds for the modem interpretation of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
B. The Modem Interpretation of The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
The Court's proclamation in Trop v. Dulles that "evolving standards of de-
cency"'4 is the litmus test for determining whether a law violates the principles
embodied in the Eighth Amendment represented the Court's vehicle for unam-
biguously promulgating the clause's modem interpretation. 42 Although the
was confronted with a method of execution - electrocution - that was the offspring of a
technological advance - electricity. See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 442-43; see also Gray v.
Lucas, 463 U.S.. 1237, 1246 (Marshall, J., dissenting to denial of certiorari) (discussing
the movement away from primitive modes of execution to more modem modes); see also
STEPHEN TROMBLEY, THE ExE=ON PROTOCOL 16-22 (1992).
37 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
See id. In 1988 the Supreme Court announced that this was precisely the message
sent by the Weems Court in 1910. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 n.4
(1988); Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 695 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2125
(1994) (dissenting opinion notes that Weems called for expanding the cruel and unusal
punishment clause).
39 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
0 Id. at 101. Even the Court in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1976), ac-
knowledged the validity of this facet of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
4' Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
42 Prior to Trop the Court had ventured in this area, but failed to advance a significant
change. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890) (Court's endorsement of the search
for humane methods of execution); see also Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329
U.S. 459, 474 (1947) (Burton, J., dissenting).
The application of the Trop standard is not limited to cases challenging the constitu-
tionality of the method of execution. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988)
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"evolving standards of decency" standard is the pinnacle of the inquiry into the
constitutionality of a method of execution, the variables encompassed in this in-
quiry still must be determined. While dissension still exists as to the proper res-
olution of these issues, 43 a perusal of past and present jurisprudence supports the
conclusion that the application of this modem standard requires evaluating two
variables. These two variables can be referred to as the qualitative component
and the quantitative component.
V. THE QUALITATIVE DIMENSION OF THE ANALYSIS OF WHETHER A METHOD OF
EXECUTION COMPORTS WITH THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS CLAUSE
The test for evaluating whether a method of execution passes constitutional
muster is comprised of two critical factors: the qualitative, or subjective, feature,
and the quantitative, or objective, feature." The qualitative factor is composed of
three core factors: whether death is instantaneous; whether death is lingering;
and whether death is painful. Consequently, if the method of execution satisfies
the qualitative dimension of the cruel and unusual punishments clause's evolving
standards of decency test, it must be "certain to produce instantaneous, and,
(evolving standards of decency prohibit the execution of someone who was 15 years old
or younger at the time the offense was committed); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977) (evolving standards hold that execution for the crime of rape is excessive and dis-
proportionate to the severity of the offense); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)
(applying evolving standards of decency to medical care for incarcerated individuals); cf
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (evolving standards of decency are not vio-
lated by the execution of 16- and 17- year-old individuals as modem societal consensus
does not condemn it).
43 The clash between the majority opinion in Campbell and Judge Reinhardt's forceful
dissent illustrate this point. See Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994); see also Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Cal. 1995),
aff'd, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996).
As previously noted, this article's inquiry is limited to the qualitative feature. See
supra Part I. See also Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 2126 (Blackmun, J., dissenting to denial of
certiorari); Gray v. Lucas, 463 U.S. 1237, 1245-46 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting to de-
nial of certiorari); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 278-79, 296-97 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Campbell, 18 F.3d at 682, 697-700 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); Fierro, 865 F.
Supp. at 1405-08.
The court has previously endorsed using the objective standard in other contexts as-
sessing the constitutionality of the disputed practice. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815 (1988) (few states allow the death penalty for individuals who were younger
than 16 at the time of the crime); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (most states
do not allow the execution of incompetent condemned inmates); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782 (1982) (few states allow the death penalty for someone who was not the "trig-
ger person"); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (few states allow death as a method
of punishment for rape); see also Campbell, 114 S.Ct. at 2126-27 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing to denial of certiorari); cf. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (majority of
states permit the imposition of the death penalty when the offender was 16 years or older
at the time the crime was committed.).
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therefore, painless death."4 5
The genesis of the instantaneous death requirement occurred more than one
hundred years ago in the In re Kemmler decision.46 In Kemmler the Supreme
Court of the United States recited and endorsed the various New York courts'
assurances that electtocution as a method of punishment would result in an in-
stantaneous and painless death.47 For example, the Court relied upon the conclu-
sion that "[there is no] reasonable doubt that the application of electricity to the
vital parts of the human body, under such conditions and in the manner contem-
plated by the statute, must result in instantaneous, and consequently in painless
death." 48Accordingly, the Court embraced the principle that in order for a
method of execution not to inflict cruel and unusual punishment, it must guaran-
tee an instantaneous and painless death 49
The "lingering death" component also has its origin in the In re Kemmler de-
cision. The Court noted, "Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of
that word as used in the Constitution. It implies there is something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life."50 Thus, using
In re Kemmler as a vehicle to develop jurisprudence in this context, the Court
established the requirement that in order for the method at issue to be found
constitutional it cannot cause the condemned to suffer a "lingering death." Tex-
tually the lingering death facet might appear redundant since the Eighth Amend-
ment already requires that the mechanism of death produce an instantaneous
death. These two components are distinguishable, however. The proscription
against a method of execution which causes a lingering death actually augments
the instantaneous death requirement. When evaluating the constitutionality of a
particular method, a court must examine objective evidence, primarily the
amount of time that passes before an individual actually expires.
The final component of the quantitative standard mandates that the method of
execution result in a painless death. This prong of the standard also originated
in the In re Kemmler opinion through the Court's endorsement of the position
that the method of execution "must result in . . . painless[] death.""
15 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 442-44 (1890).
4 See supra Part IV.A. (discussing the Kemmler case).
'7 See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 443-44.
4 Id. (emphasis added).
49 This conclusion was advanced by Justice Butler in his dissenting opinion in Louisi-
ana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 475 (1947) (Butler, J., dissenting). Justice
Butler noted that substantively the Kemmler Court established that methods of execution
must produce an instantaneous death as opposed to "death by installments." id. at 474.
50 Kemmier, 136 U.S. at 447 (emphasis added); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 173 (1976); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958); Resweber, 329 U.S. at 463;
Granucci, supra note 12, at 862.
5' Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 443-44; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 238, 271
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Resweber, 329 U.S. at 474 (Burton, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that the Court held in Kemmler that death by electrocution was not cruel and unusual
punishment because death was instantaneous and painless); Gardner, supra note 4, at
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The Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Fierro v. Gomez52 substantially adopts
this multi-faceted standard to assess the constitutionality of a method of execu-
tion. The Fierro court cited the requirement established by In re Kemmler that
the mode of execution must not involve a "lingering death."'5 3 It also incorpo-
rated the criteria that the death be spontaneous.5 4 Yet the Ninth Circuit suggested
that the spontaneous death component might be satisfied if the method of execu-
tion causes spontaneous unconsciousness.55 Relying on its opinion in Campbell,
5 6
the court stated that "[dJeath where unconsciousness is likely to be immediate or
within a matter of seconds is apparently within constitutional limits. ' ' 57 The
court also addressed the need for the death producing mechanism to result in a
painless death. 58
With the standard established, the next step is to decide whether the present
methods of execution satisfy the qualitative dimension of the evolving standards
of decency test. This task is best accomplished by applying the qualitative di-
mension's individual components to the methods of execution presently used and
analyzing the outcome in each instance.
A. The Method of Execution Must Cause Instantaneous Death
The methods of execution presently in use are lethal gas, lethal injection,
hanging, the firing squad, and electrocution.5 9 To pass constitutional muster, each
method must cause the condemned individual to die instantaneously. Serious
noncompliance problems exist with respect to this element.
Death by hanging provides a haunting and frightening example of this prob-
lem.6° The typical gallows protocol requires using a rope between 3/4 and 1 '/4 in-
ches in diameter.6' A thick rope is used because "a very slender ligature is more
prone to break the skin, increasing the chances of partial or complete decapita-
tion. 116 The rope is boiled and stretched to reduce its elasticity and coated with
wax or oil so that it slides easier on to the neck and helps the neck bear the ki-
netic energy created by the force of the drop.63 The condemned person is
103-05.
52 77 F3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996).
53 Id. at 304.
54 See id. at 306.
11 See id.
56 Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.) (holding that death by hanging is constitu-
tional) (quoting Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Cal. 1994)), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 2125 (1994).
57 Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301, 307 (9th Cir. 1996).
58 See id. at 307.
59 See Appendix A.
60 The State of Washington permits death by hanging. See Appendix A.
61 See Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 683 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2125
(1994); see also Gardner, supra note 4, at 119-23.
62 Id. at 683-84.
63 See id. at 683-85.
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weighed so the proper length of rope can be determined.64 At the time of execu-
tion the noose is tightened about the neck of the condemned and tied so that the
knot is just below the left ear.65 The individual is then placed over a trap door
which later opens, causing the person's body to fall through the hole below.66 A
doctor observes the hanging and checks the person's vital signs once the body
stops moving. 61 After all signs of life cease, the inmate is pronounced dead.
68
Once another fifteen to twenty minutes pass, the body is released from the noose
and an autopsy performed. 69
For an execution by hanging, the accuracy of the length of the "drop" is ex-
tremely important.70 If performed correctly, the hanging dislocates the neck of
the condemned, causing a fairly rapid death. 71 If the drop is too short, however,
there is a substantial risk that the individual will be asphyxiated and "suffer a
slow lingering, and painful death." 72 The following passage describes what oc-
curs when this risk materializes:
[L]ividity and swelling of the face, especially of the ears and lips, which
appear distorted; the eyelids swollen, and of a blueish colour; the eyes red,
projecting forwards, and sometimes partially forced out of their cavities[; .
. . a bloody froth or frothy mucus sometimes escaping from the lips and
nostrils[;] . . . the fingers are generally much contracted or firmly
clenched[;] . . . the urine and faeces are sometimes involuntarily expelled at
the moment of death.
73
64 See id. at 683.
65 See id. at 685.
66 See id. (adapted from testimony of Dr. Brady, a witness to the execution of Westley
Alan Dodd in January, 1993, in Washington State).
67 See id.
61 See id.
69 See id.
70 See Harold Hillman, 22 Perceptions 745, 746 (1993); Campbell, 18 F.3d at 684.
1' See Campbell, 18 F.3d at 683-84; Gardner, supra note 4, at 120. The precise cause
of death from hanging results from various mechanisms. The Campbell opinion provides
the following list of some of the exact causes of death: occlusion of the carotid arteries;
occlusion of the vertebral arteries; occlusion of the jugular veins; reflexive cardiac arrest;
occlusion of the airway; tearing, transection, trauma, or shock to the spinal cord; fracture
or separation of the cervical spinal column; interruption of the odentoid process; and irre-
versible brainstem damage. See Campbell, 18 3d at 683-84.
72 Campbell, 18 F.3d at 694 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also
Campbell v. Wood, 114 S. Ct. 2125, 2127 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting to denial of
certiorari) (hanging always involves the risk of death by strangulation); Gardner, supra
note 4, at 120. One commentator has observed that "nobody doubted that hanging was a
slow and painful way of killing people. Neither the introduction of the Newgate drop in
1783 nor the lengthy debates a century later about the ratios between body weight and
drop ever succeeded in converting the gallows into an efficient instrument of death."
V.A.C. GATRELL, THE HANGING TREE 45 (1994)(emphasis added).
73 GATRELL, supra note 72, at 46 (citation omitted); see also Gardner, supra note 4, at
121.
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It is extremely difficult, if not virtually impossible, to reconcile this rendition of
death by hanging with the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause's spontaneous
death requirement.
74
Death by lethal gas presents another disturbing instance of noncompliance
with the spontaneity requirement. At the appointed time of execution, the con-
demned is led into the gas chamber, where straps are placed across his legs,
arms, groin, and chest to fasten securely the condemned into the execution
chair.71 One physician monitors the person's heartrate with an electrocardio-
gram. 76 Under the chair is a bowl containing a mixture of sulfuric acid and dis-
tilled water.77 A bag containing one pound of sodium cyanide pellets hangs over
the bowl." The executioner releases the pellets into the liquid filled bowl. 79 The
deadly chemical reaction releases hydrogen cyanide gas that rises through the
holes in the condemned's chair.80 Prior to the execution, the prisoner will have
been told to take a deep breath when he smells rotten eggs. After inhaling the
lethal gas, the inmate experiences trouble breathing. One observer noted that the
condemned inmate's breathing efforts resembled those of "a choking man with
a rope cutting off his windpipe . . . . He could get no air in the chamber."8 1
Before eventually losing consciousness, "there is evidence of extreme horror,
pain and strangling. The eyes pop. The skin turns purple and the victim begins
to drool." '82
This method of execution depletes the body's oxygen cells and "is analogous
to ... suffocation due to drowning or strangulation.18 3 The sensation felt by the
dying individuals is often referred to as "air hunger."1 4 Because the condemned
74 As detailed above, the Campbell court was aware that this mode of execution cre-
ated the risk that death could occur by decapitation or asphyxiation, neither consequence
satisfying the spontaneous death prerequisite. The court refused, however, to find that
death by hanging violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. See Campbell, 18
F.3d at 687.
75 See Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1391 (N.D. Cal. 1995), aff'd, 77 F.3d 301
(9th Cir. 1996).
76 See id.
77 See id. at 1391-92.
78 See id. at 1392.
79 See id.
80 See id.
81 Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 1059 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983).
82 Jacob Weisberg, This Is Your Death; Capital Punishment: What Really Happens, 205
NEw REPUBLIC 23 (1991). Once the doctor pronounces the inmate dead, a vent is opened
and an exhaust fan is turned on to remove the deadly gas from the chamber. The body is
then sprayed with ammonia to neutralize the remaining gas. After a short interval, order-
lies, in gas masks and gloves, remove the body after first ruffling the hair to release any
gas. See id. For similar descriptions of death by lethal gas, see Fierro, 865 F. Supp. at
1391-92; Gardner, supra note 4, at 127-28; Hillman, supra note 70, at 748.
83 Fierro, 865 F. Supp. at 1396; see also Gray, 710 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
463 U.S. 1237 (1983).
84 Fierro, 865 F. Supp. at 1396.
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inmate is fighting a losing battle for air, death is not instantaneous. Eyewitness
testimony further supports the conclusion that the extinguishment of life pro-
duced by the use of lethal gas is not spontaneous. A correctional officer witness-
ing Billy Wesley Monk's execution by lethal gas in 1961 described the con-
demned man's death throes as a "thrashing about in search of oxygen very
much like a fish out of water."85 Jesse Walter Bishop's involuntary meeting with
the gas chamber resulted in what was described as a "protracted struggle with
the lethal cyanide gas"8 6 before finally succumbing to the lethal fumes. The
same observer noted that "you could not tell when Mr. Bishop finally lost con-
sciousness." 8 7 There is clear evidence of the serious problems concerning lethal
gas' ability to comply with this portion of the constitutional mandate. Excluding
Judge Patel's decision in Fierro v. Gomez,88 which the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit recently affirmed, 9 most courts continue to hold this method of
execution constitutional.
90
The administration of electrical currents to an individual as a means of caus-
ing death presents another situation where it is unlikely that the instantaneous
death requirement is satisfied. The inmate is led into the death chamber, where
belts are fastened around the person's chest, groin, legs, and arms to strap him
into the electric chair.91 The head is secured to the back of the chair and elec-
trodes are placed on shaved locations on the person's head and legs.92 The elec-
trode placed on the head is attached to a sponge moistened to aid conductivity.93
Attendants place a helmet over the prisoner's head as witnesses, guards and a
doctor all move to an observation room. The first jolt of electricity is applied at
2000-2200 volts between seven and twelve amperes.94 Following delivery of the
first surge, the doctor waits for the body to cool, wipes moisture from the chest,
and applies a stethoscope.9 If the inmate is still alive, the state applies another
jolt.96 Otherwise, the doctor pronounces the inmate dead. Generally the body is
85 Id. at 1403.
86 Gray, 710 F.2d at 1058.
87 id. at 1059.
11 865 F Supp. 1387 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
89 See Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996).
90 See, e.g., Gray, 710 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir.) (holding that death by lethal gas is consti-
tutional), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983); Gerlaugh v. Lewis, 898 F. Supp. 1388 (D.
Ariz. 1995) (same); Hunt v. Smith, 856 F. Supp. 251 (D. Md. 1994) (same), aff d sub
nor. Hunt v. Nuth, 57 F.3d 1327 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 724 (1996).
91 See Deborah Denno, Is Electrocution an Unconstitutional Method of Execution? The
Engineering of Death over the Century, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 551, 636 (1994).
92 See Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1086 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting to de-
nial of certiorari).
9 See Denno, supra note 91, at 651.
9 See Glass, 471 U.S. at 1086 n.13 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting to denial of
certiorari).
9' See Denno, supra note 91, at 631.
96 See Glass, 471 U.S. at 1090.
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extremely hot with third-degree bums on the scalp and the legs.97 The brain
practically cooks as many tissues swell or burst.98 After the body cools it is re-
moved for an autopsy.99 Consider a condensed version of what "[w]itnesses rou-
tinely report" regarding electrocution as a mechanism of death: "The con-
demned prisoner 'cringes,' 'leaps,' and 'fights the straps with amazing strength.'
'The hands turn red, then white, and cords of the neck stand out like steel
bands.' The prisoner's limbs, fingers, toes, and face are severely contorted.''10
A variety of factors, including poor maintenance of the necessary equipment,
lack of trained personnel, and differences in physiological resistance,' 0' contrib-
ute to this method's inability to comply with the instantaneousness requirement.
Jesse Tafero's bungled execution in 1990 is perhaps the most notorious example
of how electrocution does not result in a spontaneous death. 0 2 When Tafero re-
ceived the first jolt of electricity, flames erupted from his head. 0 3 This malfunc-
tion was allegedly due to the use of improper equipment - a synthetic sponge
instead of a natural sponge was placed in the headpiece - and properly trained
personnel were not present for the execution" 4 Because of these errors, three
jolts of electricity were delivered to Tafero before he expired. 05 Because of the
conductivity problems which prevented the deliverance of the appropriate
amount of electrical current to Tafero during the first jolt, it is unlikely that he
died instantaneously.
B. The Method of Execution Cannot Result in a "Lingering Death"
Death by lethal gas poses serious risks of noncompliance with the ban on
methods which result in a lingering death. Dr. Traystman,1 6 a noted expert on
97 See Denno, supra note 91, at 637.
98 See Glass, 471 U.S. at 1088.
99 See Hillman, supra note 70, at 747; See also Weisberg, supra note 82; Denno, supra
note 91 at 630-33 (1994); Gardner, supra note 4, at 125-27.
100 Glass, 471 U.S. at 1086-87.
1)' See id. at 1089; Denno, supra note 91, at 648 n.632 (addressing the issue of lack of
proper training).
101 Other disturbing examples of the failure to comply with the spontaneity component
are described in Deborah Denno's article. See Denno, supra note 91, at 664-74.
103 See Florida Executes Killer, Electric Chair Works Properly, SUN SENTINEL, July 28,
1990, at 19A; see also Ellen McGarrahan, Maintenance Man Changed 'Worn-Out'
Sponge on Own, MIAMI HERALD, May 9, 1990, at B5.
'04 See TROMBLEY, supra note 36, at 44-51; see also Tom Davidson, Maintenance
Workers Switched Sponge for Execution, SUN SENIINEL, May 9, 1990, at 1 A; Larry Kel-
ler, Foes Call Execution Cruel, Unusual Torture, SUN SENTINEL, May 5, 1990 at IA; Mc-
Garrahan, supra note 69; Donna O'Neal, Killer's Death Came Instantly, Martinez Says,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 9, 1990, at BI.
io5 See Keller, supra note 104.
106 Dr. Traystman is an expert on hypoxia and its effects on the heart and brain. He is
the Vice Chair of the Department of Anesthesiology and Critical Care Medicine and Di-
rector of Research at the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine. Dr. Traystman
provided expert testimony on behalf of the condemned inmates in Gray and Fierro who
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the subject, observes that
[wihen anoxia 17 sets in, the brain remains alive for two to five minutes.
The heart will continue to beat for a period of time after that, perhaps five
to seven minutes, or longer, though at a very low cardiac output. Death can
occur ten to twelve minutes after the gas is released in the chamber. °S
California's execution of Aaron Mitchell supports Dr. Traystman's conclusion.' 9
Howard Brodie, an artist for CBS news, witnessed five executions, including
Aaron Mitchell's in 1967.110 In providing a rendition of his observations, Brodie
noted the following:
His head was down for several seconds. Then, as we had thought it was
over, he again lifted his head in another convulsion. His eyes were open, he
strained and he looked at me. I said one more time, automatically, "My
Jesus I Love You." And he went with me, mouthing the prayer."'
When Jesse Walter Bishop was executed in 1979, prison officials stated that it
took twelve minutes for him to die.1 2 One execution eyewitness claimed, how-
ever, that Mr. Bishop's body was still moving after twelve minutes had lapsed."
3
It is difficult to imagine how a death occurring ten to twelve minutes after the
life cessation apparatus is set in motion complies with the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause's prohibition against inflicting a lingering death." 4 The situ-
ation has not improved following these occurences. When David Mason was ex-
ecuted by the state of California in 1993, eyewitnesses reported that it took ap-
proximately one minute from the time he began to breathe the lethal gas before
he appeared to lose consciousness. Media observations suggest that conscious-
ness persisted for "between one and three minutes."'s' For example, breathing
deadly fumes for three minutes without actual death occurring qualifies as a lin-
were challenging death by lethal gas on the basis that it constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. See Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 1059-60 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S.
1237 (1983); Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1393-94 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affd 77
F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996).
'ot Anoxia is a physical condition that occurs when the body ceases to receive oxygen.
See Gray, 710 F.2d at 1060. Webster's defines anoxia as "a deficiency of oxygen reach-
ing the tissues of the body] especially of such severity as to result in permanent dam-
age." MIRAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 48 (10th ed. 1993).
"i Gray, 710 F.2d at 1060 (emphasis added).
109 See id. at 1059.
110 See id.
I d.
112 See id.
113 See id.
14 In his dissenting opinion to the denial of certiorari in Gray v. Lucas, Justice Mar-
shall noted that a death which takes 10 to 12 minutes to occur is lingering and thus un-
constitutional. See Gray, 463 U.S. at 1245. This is not to say necessarily that the con-
verse - that a death is not lingering if it takes less than 10 minutes - is true.
"' Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1402 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affid. 77 F.3d 301 (9th
Cir. 1996).
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gering death. Similar observations were made when the state of California exe-
cuted Robert Harris in 1992. Harris did not lapse into "apparent unconscious-
ness until two minutes after the cyanide gas hit [his] face." 6 Another minute
passed before the attending physician could confirm that Harris was
unconscious." 7
Findings made in connection with hangings and the time until death occurs
provide additional evidence of noncompliance with the lingering death prohibi-
tion. Hanging poses significant risks of asphyxiation or partial decapitation.' 18 If
the length of the drop is too short, there is a substantial risk that the inmate's
death will result from asphyxiation.' 19 Death by asphyxiation is not rapid; in-
deed, it is a slow death. 20 When asphyxiation occurs, it can take as long as
fourteen minutes for the individual to die.' 2' The Ninth Circuit has interpreted
Campbell v. Wood 122 to hold that the "persistence of consciousness for over a
minute or for between a minute and a minute-and-a-half, but no longer than two
minutes might be outside the constitutional boundaries"'' 2 of cruel and unusual
punishment.
The electric chair also presents problems in satisfying this aspect of the cruel
and unusual punishment standard. As previously noted, it took several minutes
before Jesse Tafero expired following his execution. 24 In addition, what "wit-
nesses routinely report" regarding what occurs during electrocution supports the
proposition that this is not a means for producing a "timely" death. For exam-
ple, "when the switch is thrown, the condemned prisoner 'cringes,' 'leaps,' and
'fights the straps with amazing strength.' "'25 The condemned person's struggle
once the electrical current starts flowing demonstrates the passage of time before
death actually occurs. This is contrary to what the lingering death component
requires.
Death by lethal injection also has problems complying with this component of
the test. This means of extinguishing life typically involves a three-step process.
First, an anesthetic such as sodium pentothal is administered to the inmate, ren-
dering him unconscious. Next the state injects a drug such as pavulon, para-
lyzing the individual's respiratory system and muscles. Lastly, the individual is
16 Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301, 307 (9th Cir. 1996).
117 See id.
"8 Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 683-84 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2125
(1994); see also GATRELL, supra note 72, at 46; Gardner, supra note 4, at 120.
119 See Campbell, 18 F3d at 684; See also Gardner, supra note 4, at 120.
120 See Campbell, 18 F.3d at 708 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); Hillman, supra note 70, at
746; Gardner, supra note 4, at 120-21.
121 See Gardner, supra note 4, at 121.
M 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994).
'2 Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301, 307 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F.
Supp. 1387, 1410-11 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (citing Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 684 (9th
Cir. 1994))). The Ninth Circuit relied upon this in affirming Judge Patel's decision that
death by lethal gas violates the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 309.
14 See supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
1' Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1086-87 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting.).
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given a dose of potassium chloride, ceasing the person's pulmonary functions.'2
Texas' 1988 execution of Raymond Landry illustrates the problems associated
with lethal injection's inability to comply with the nonlingering death factor. In
accordance with Texas execution protocol, Landry was strapped to a gurney and
two intravenous needles were inserted into his arms.1 21 The lethal drugs flowed
for approximately two minutes when suddently one of the lines began to leak.12s
Fourteen minutes then lapsed before the execution could resume.129 In all,
twenty-four minutes passed before Landry was pronounced dead. 3° An execu-
tion, however, does not have to reach the extremes of the Landry case to raise
concerns. For example, when Fletcher Thomas Mann was executed by lethal in-
jection in Texas, seven minutes passed before he died.' 3 ' Lastly, compliance with
this mandate can be frustrated if the condemned inmate was a former drug user
whose significant tolerance to the drugs administered during the execution could
result in a "lingering death."
Death by firing squad also has the potential to violate the lingering death pro-
hibition. There are several ways a state may administer an execution by firing
squad. For example, protocol may require the participation of a single shooter or
of several shooters. If a state utilizes several shooters, one may use a rifle con-
taining blank rounds. 3 2 Typically, the condemned invididual is strapped to a spe-
cially designed chair, a black hood is placed over his face,'33 and a white cloth
target is pinned over his heart. A pile of sandbags is arranged behind the chair
126 See Hillman, supra note 70, at 748; See also TROMBLEY, supra note 36, at 76, 79-
80; Gardner, supra note 4, at 128-29; Don Colburn, Lethal Injection: Why Doctors are
Uneasy About the Newest Method of Capital Punishment, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1990, at
Z12; Paul Valentine, Under New Maryland Law, a New Mode of Death: But Condemned
Killer's Attorneys Say Lethal Injection Is Inhumane, WASH. POST (May 8, 1994).
California uses saline, potassium chloride and panucuronium bromide. Kenneth J. Gar-
cia, San Quentin's Step-by-Step Guide to Execution Procedure 770 Governs Condemned
Convicts' Final Hours, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Feb. 21, 1996, at Al.
127 See Texas Killer Executed After Hitch 14-Minute Delay As Needle Falls Out,
SAC RmENTo BEE, Dec. 13, 1988, at A9 [hereinafter Texas Killer Executed After Hitch].
28 See id.; see also Execution Goes Awry As Lethal Fluid Leaks, MIAMI HERALD, Dec.
14, 1988, at 1A [hereinafter Execution Goes Awry]; Murderer Executed After a Leaky Le-
thal Injection, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 14, 1988, at A29.
29 See Colbum, supra note 126, at Z12; Execution Goes Awry, supra note 128; Texas
Killer Executed After Hitch, supra note 127.
3 See Texas Killer Executed After Hitch, supra note 127; Murderer Executed After a
Leaky Lethal Injection, supra note 128.
'I" See Louisville Native Executed in Texas for 1980 Dallas Murders, Rape, LEXINGTON
HERALD LEADER, June 2, 1995, at B4.
132 See Hillman, supra note 70, at 745; Gardner, supra note 4, at 123-24. In Utah,
where John Albert Taylor was recently executed by firing squad, five anonymous
marksmen shot him with deer rifles. See Matthew Brown, Child Killer Executed by Utah
Firing Squad, AP, Jan. 26, 1996, available in WESTLAW, AP File. One of Taylor's
shooters had a gun with blank rounds. See id.
133 See Brown, supra note 122.
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to absorb the impact of the bullets. 34 If the executioners miss the heart, inten-
tionally or unintentionally, the person encounters a substantial risk that he or she
will die a slow death.
This brief survey reveals the significant problems that continue to exist in en-
suring that the methods of execution adhere to the Eighth Amendment's ban
against protracted death.
C. The Method of Execution Must Result in a Painless Death
Because "[nleither consciousness nor pain is easy to gauge," ' evaluating
compliance with this component is not an easy task. The number of courts either
ignoring this issue or refusing to conduct a substantive analysis of the issue is
startling. 3 6 For example, in Hunt v. Smith13 7 the district court, in response to a
plaintiff's challenge to the constitutionality of lethal injection as a method of ex-
ecution, stated that lethal injection is intended to be "more humane" than other
methods of execution. Yet the assertion of a consequence is different than sub-
stantively ascertaining whether something is actually the case, i.e., that death
would be painless. 3 Furthermore, the examination of the various methods of ex-
ecution 139 provides ample support for the proposition that all of the mechanisms
are seriously flawed in terms of satisfying the Eighth Amendment's painless
death requirement. The importance of the painless death requirement cannot be
overemphasized. For example, in a recent decision affirming the unconstitution-
ality of death by lethal gas, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the method of ex-
ecution must produce a painless death for it to comply with the Eighth
Amendment.140
There are a multitude of consequences which make death by legal gas pain-
fill.' 4 ' Dr. Traystman's general description of what occurs when lethal gas is used
provides a powerful and compelling comment on the pain inherent in this mode
of death:
134 See id.
135 Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1400 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affd, 77 F.3d 301 (9th
Cir. 1996).
,36 See cases cited supra note 4.
137 856 F. Supp. 251 (D. Md. 1994).
138 As Judge Reinhardt noted in his dissent, this is precisely the tactic used by the
Campbell majority. See Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 693 (9th Cir.) (Reinhardt, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994).
'39 See infra Appendix A.
'40 See Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301, 306-07 (9th Cir. 1996).
'4' At trial, both parties in Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Cal. 1994), aff'd,
77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996), offered evidence regarding the effects of lethal gas on execu-
tionees. The court cited numerous authorities regarding the implications of lethal gas. See
id. at 1395-99 (citing, among other authorities, BRYAN BALLENTINE & TIMOTHY C.
MARRS. CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ToXIcoLoGY OF CYANIDES (1987)). Those sources
provide thorough discussions of the various types of pain an inmate experiences when
killed by lethal gas. See generally BALLENTINE & MARRs, supra.
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Very simply, cyanide gas blocks the utilization of the oxygen in the body's
cells. Gradually, depending on the rate and volume of inspiration, and on
the concentration of the cyanide that is inhaled, the person exposed to cya-
nide gas will become anoxic. This is a condition defined by no oxygen.
Death will follow through asphyxiation, when the heart and brain cease to
receive oxygen. The hypoxic state can continue for several minutes after the
cyanide gas is released in the execution chamber. The person exposed to
this gas remains conscious for a period of time, in some cases for several
minutes, again depending on the rate and volume of the gas that is inhaled.
During this time the person is unquestionably experiencing pain and ex-
treme anxiety. The pain begins immediately, and is felt in the arms, shoul-
ders, back, and chest. The sensation is similar to the pain felt by a person
during a heart attack, where essentially, the heart is being deprived of oxy-
gen. The severity of the pain varies directly with the diminishing oxygen
reaching the tissues. 42
More specifically, there is a significant risk that when the poisoned gas is intro-
duced into the death chamber, the condemned individual will suffer from acido-
sis.' 43 The degree of pain experienced by the condemned inmate could be
equivalent to that experienced by a heart attack victim.'"
Tetany, 41 however, is perhaps the most painful condition associated with
death by lethal gas. Tetany produces painful muscle contractions. Several experts
note that the "muscular contractions [can be] so severe that the body is 'arched
backwards like a bridge,' with contractions of sufficient force to 'compress and
fracture the vertebrae.'4 Most importantly, "to a conscious person, tetany is
extremely painful."'' 4 Eyewitness accounts support the conclusion that Bobby
Mason suffered painful tetany when he was executed by the state of California
in 1993.' 48 Likewise, an eyewitness account of Jesse Walter Bishop's execution
supports the conclusion that while dying, he suffered from painful tetany as
"[his head lurched back. His eyes widened, and he strained as much as the
straps that held him to the chair would allow."' 49 Key to the eyewitness' de-
scriptions of Mr. Bishop's actions is that he "unquestionably appeared to be in
142 Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 1060 (5th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 463
U.S. 1237 (1983).
143 Acidosis is a painful condition that can occur if lactic acid builds up in the cells
that are deprived of oxygen because of the cyanide. See Fierro, 865 F. Supp. at 1396.
Webster's defines acidosis as "an abnormal condition characterized by reduced alkalinity
of the blood and of the body tissues." MmRAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGiATE DICrMONARY 10
(10th ed. 1993).
'4 See Fierro, 865 F. Supp. at 1396.
145 Tetany is defined as "a condition of physiologic calcium imbalance marked by
tonic spasm of muscles and often associated with deficient parathyroid secretion." Mat-
RIAM-WEnsrER'S COLLEATE DICTIONARY 1218 (10th ed. 1993).
'4s Fierro, 865 F. Supp. at 1396.
147 Id. (emphasis added).
'8 See id. at 1402.
149 Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 1058 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983).
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pain." 150
The absence of a painless death is also found when electrocution is the
method of death. "[A] number of distinguished electrical scientists and medical
doctors have argued that the available evidence strongly suggests that electrocu-
tion causes unspeakable pain and suffering."' 51 One early critic of electrocution
denounced the method because of the pain it would inflict upon the condemned
inmate, concluding that
[tihe current flows along a restricted path into the body, and destroys all
the tissues confronted in this path. In the meantime the vital organs may be
preserved; and pain, too great for us to imagine, is induced. The brain has
four parts. The current may only touch only one of these parts; so that the
individual retains consciousness and a keen sense of agony. For the sufferer,
time stands still; and this excruciating torture seems to last for an
eternity.1
5 2
A key cause of the pain the individual may experience comes from being burned
by the electric current administered during the electrocution.'53 There is also the
risk that the condemned will catch on fire. 54 Brief descriptions of several execu-
tions best demonstrate the painfulness of the death endured by those whose lives
have been extinguished in the electric chair. Jesse Tafero, undoubtedly suffered
an excruciatingly painful death. The incorrect sponge used in his headpiece re-
duced the impact of the electrical currents delivered to Mr. Tafero. As a result,
when the twelve-inch blue and orange flames came out of his head, the current
was stopped. 55 Because he was still breathing, the state repeatedly administered
the current.'56 Mr. Tafero finally succumbed after receiving the third jolt of elec-
tricity. Since the use of improper equipment weakened the electrical current, Mr.
Tafero probably suffered a painful death as he "roast[ed] to death slowly.'
'1 57
Wilbert Lee Evans was electrocuted by the Commonwealth of Virginia in 1990.
Mr. Evans, like Mr. Tafero, did not die after he received the first jolt of electric-
ity. In fact, one witness reported that Mr. Evans made audible signs after receiv-
ing the first jolt, "suggesting that he may have suffered initially."'5 8 Derick Pe-
terson was also executed by electrocution in Virginia. After he received the first
jolt of electricity, "Peterson's hands and feet clench[ed]; his head jerk[ed]. His
1SO Id.
,"I Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1088 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting to denial of
certiorari); see also Hillman, supra note 70, at 747.
152 Gardner, supra note 4, at 125-26 n.217 (quoting Nicola Tesla); see also Glass, 471
U.S. at 1088 (Brennan, J., dissenting to denial of certiorari).
'W' See Hillman, supra note 70, at 747; TROMBLEY, supra note 36, at 44-51, 56-60;
Denno, supra note 91, at 637.
154 See TROMBLEY, supra note 36, at 44-51.
'55 See WEISBERG, supra note 82; see also TROMBLEY, supra note 36, at 44-51.
'56 See TROMBLEY, supra note 36, at 44-51.
157 WEISBERG, supra note 82.
158 Denno, supra note 91, at 671 (quoting Tim Cox).
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feet relax[ed] [and] he "moan[ed] softly," but he was not dead.5 9 A condensed
version of what eyewitnesses observe when the electric chair is used to execute
provides a strong portrait of the painfulness of death by electrocution:
[Wlhen the switch is thrown, the condemned prisoner "cringes," "leaps,"
and "fights the straps with amazing strength." "The hands turn red, then
white, and the cords of the neck stand out like steel bands." "The pris-
oner's limbs, fingers, toes, and face are severely contorted. The force of the
electrical current is so powerful that the prisoner's eyeballs sometimes pop
out and "rest on [his] cheeks." The prisoner often defecates, urinates, and
vomits blood and drool .... .. The body turns bright red as the tempera-
ture rises,"and the prisoner's "flesh swells and his skin stretches to the
point of breaking." Sometimes the prisoner catches on fire, particularly if
[he] perspires excessively. Witnesses hear a loud and sustained sound "like
bacon frying," and "the sickly sweet smell of burning flesh" permeates the
chamber.160
Death by lethal injection also raises concerns pertaining to the painless death
requirement. Much remains unknown about what occurs when this process is
used, especially regarding whether the condemned retains the ability to feel after
receiving the first injection. Proponents of this method argue that the condemned
individual is "asleep" and thus can not feel anything.' 61 Crtics contend that there
is a significant risk that the individual could suffer a painful death. One such
risk is that once the muscle relaxing drug is administered, the inmate while
seemingly asleep, may actually be capable of experiencing pain but is debilitated
to such a degree that prevents communication.' 62 Consequently, when the state
administers the drug which ceases the functioning of the heart, the individual
could be experiencing tremendous pain, but the paralysis created by the previous
drugs renders him or her unable to communicate the fact they are in pain.'16 Fur-
thermore, the process used to administer the lethal drugs heightens the risk of
this occurring. In most instances, the condemned inmates receive a uniform
amount of the deadly mixture administered through a machine.' 4 Other protocols
use a "questimate" approach to the amount of drugs to use.'6 Under both sce-
narios there is no correlation between the quantity of drugs necessary to take the
,s9 Id. at 672 (quoting Mike Allen).
16 Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1087 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting to denial of
certiorari) (footnotes ommitted).
161 See WEISBERG, supra note 82.
162 See Colbum, supra note 126; Murderer Executed After a Leaky Lethal Injection,
N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 14, 1988, at A29.
'63 See TROMBLEY, supra note 36, at 157, 174 (providing examples of lethal injection
executions where the inmate experienced a painful death); Denno, supra note 91, at 657.
,64 See TROMBLEY, supra note 36; Denno, supra note 91, at 657; see Garcia, supra note
126, at Al; Elizabeth Fernandez, All Forms of Execution Produce Horror Stories, The
Execution of Robert Alton Harris, SAN FRANcisco ExAMiNER, Apr. 22, 1992, at A14.
165 See Fernandez, supra note 164, at A14 (quoting Karima Wicks, NAACP Legal De-
fense Fund Capital Punishment Project).
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condemned individual's life and his or her physical characteristics. Consequently,
under either scenario, if a condemned inmate has a higher tolerance to the drugs
employed, possibly due to prior drug abuse, there is a greater risk that the in-
mate will be paralyzed, but will be unable to communicate the pain caused by
the drugs designed to stop the pulmonary function. It is not necessary, however,
for an inmate to have a history of drug abuse in order for death by lethal injec-
tion to be painful. When Raymond Landry was executed witnesses heard him
groan at least once during the time period after the lethal drugs had been flow-
ing into his body for two minutes and before the fourteen minutes that lapsed
before the line was repaired after one of the intravenous lines popped out.
166
Death by hanging also has problems complying with the painless death re-
quirement. 67 If the length of the drop is too long, there is a risk that the indi-
vidual's death will be the result of total or partial decapitation. 68 The pain asso-
ciated with having one's head severed from one's body seems unimaginable. It
would certainly occupy a low position on the spectrum of painless deaths. Also,
an inmate runs the risk of suffering pain, primarily from struggling to obtain ox-
ygen, while being asphyxiated if the drop is too short. 69
The Supreme Court implicitly upheld the constitutionality of the firing squad
as a method of execution in Wilkerson v. Utah.170 The potential for a painful
death occurring when a firing squad is employed is obvious. Although the con-
demned individual usually wears a target designed to aid the shooters in locating
the heart,'7 l there is a risk that the shooters will, intentionally or unintentionally,
miss the target and hit other parts of the person's body. For example, in one case
the condemned was shot on the wrong side of his chest and bled to death. 172 Un-
doubtedly, this man's death was painful as he lay bleeding. Thus, there is no
guarantee that an inmate will be immediately killed or rendered unconscious
166 See Execution Goes Awry, supra note 128, at IA; Texas Killer Executed After
Hitch, supra note 127, at A9.
167 "It is undeniable that every hanging involves at least some risk that the prisoner
will die a slow, painful, tortuous death." Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 694 (9th Cir.)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994) (emphasis added).
'68 See Campbell, 18 F.3d at 701 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); Gardner, supra note 4, at
120.
169 See id.
170 99 U.S. 130 (1878). This mode was implicitly deemed constitutional by the Court
in dicta. See id. at 133-37. The precise issue before the Court was whether the lower
court had the authority to select shooting as the method of execution when the statute al-
lowing the imposition of a death sentence did not proscribe a method of execution. See
id. at 136-37. Gary Gilmore was executed by firing squad in Utah in 1977. See Colbum,
supra note 126. Nineteen years passed before another individual was executed by a firing
squad. On January 26, 1996 John Albert Taylor was executed by a firing squad in Utah.
Firing Squad in Utah Executes Child Killer, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 27, 1996 at 80 (Associ-
ated Press).
17' See Denno supra note 91, at 688-89.
02 See GARDNER, supra note 4, at 124.
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before experiencing pain from the bullets that enter parts of his or her body
other than the heart.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed the issue of what standard is
necessary for ensuring compliance with the prohibition against the infliction of
cruel and unusual punishments in the context of methods of execution. 173 How-
ever, this Article's assessment supports the argument that the qualitative portion
of the standard can be articulated. As seen, evolving standards of decency re-
quire that the method of execution must result in a spontaneous death that is not
lingering or painful. Thus, at this juncture, jurisdictions with the death penalty
should follow this standard when implementing their various methods of
execution.
This brief foray into examining how the different components operate when
applied to certain methods of execution demonstrates the severe constitutional
problems with the existing methods of execution. As a result, the only proper
resolution at this time is to bar executions employing the existing methods of
execution. Consequently, the more than 3000 individuals presently living under
the sentence of death 174 should have their executions stayed.
APPENDIX A
States in Which the Death Penalty May Be Imposed (38)
Alabama Kentucky Ohio
Arizona Louisiana Oklahoma
Arkansas Maryland Oregon
California Mississippi Pennsylvania
Colorado Missouri South Carolina
Connecticut Montana South Dakota
Delaware Nebraska Tennessee
Florida Nevada Texas
Georgia New Hampshire Utah
Idaho New Jersey Virginia
173 See id. at 97. There is a possibility, however, that the Court might soon be
presented with an opportunity to decide the issue. Until recently, federal Courts of Ap-
peals have consistently upheld the constitutionality of the challenged method of execu-
tion. On February 21, 1996, however, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued
an opinion affirming a District Court judge's decision that lethal gas as a method of exe-
cution is unconstitutional because it violates the Eighth Amendment. Pete Wilson, the
governor of California, is urging that the State have the case heard by the Supreme Court
of the United States. Gas Chamber Ban Upheld NAT'L L. J., Mar. 4, 1996, at A8. If the
Court grants certiorari, then this would be the first time that the Court will directly con-
front the issue as to what standard should be used to evaluate the constitutionality of the
modes of execution.
""' See NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Death Row U.S.A. (Fall 1995).
[Vol. 6
(UN)CONSTITUTIONAL METHODS OF EXECUTION
Illinois New Mexico Washington
Indiana New York Wyoming
Kansas North Carolina
States in Which the Death Penalty May Not Be Imposed (12)
Alaska Massachusetts Rhode Island
Hawaii Michigan Vermont
Iowa Minnesota West Virginia
Maine North Dakota Wisconsin
APPENDIX B
Methods of Execution Currently in Use
LETHAL GAS
California 75
Mississippi 76
Missouri
North Carolina
ELECTROCUTION
Alabama Louisiana'77
Florida Nebraska
Georgia Ohio
Illinois Tennessee
Kentucky Virginia
LETHAL INJECTION
Arizona Maryland Pennsylvania
Arkansas Mississippi 78  South Carolina
California Missouri South Dakota
Colorado Montana Texas
Connecticut Nevada Utah
Delaware New Hampshire Washington
17 The Ninth Circuit recently held that death by lethal gas is unconstitutional, how-
ever. See Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996). This opinion was recently va-
cated by the Supreme Court and remanded to the Ninth Circuit in light of Cal. Penal §
3604. See Fierro v. Gomez, 117 S. Ct. 285 (1996).
176 Mississippi employs lethal gas only if the individual was convicted before July 1,
1984.
177 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §569 (West 1996) (Every sentence of death before Sept. 15,
1991 shall be electricution; sentences after Sept. 15, 1991 shall be by lethal injection.)
178 Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-51 (1996) (If legal injection is held unconstitutional, or if
the person was sentenced before July 1, 1984, then lethal gas is used.)
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New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
Oregon
Wyoming
United States
United States Military
HANGING
Montana
179
Washington 8 0
FIRING SQUAD
Utah
179 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-19-103 (1996) (Death is by hanging or, at the election of
the defendant, by lethal injection.).
180 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.180 (West 1996) (Death is by lethal injection or, at
the election of the defendant, by hanging.).
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Louisiana
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